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Article: 
In his Foundations of Ethics, W. D. Ross continued to maintain the view, first developed in The Right and the 
Good, that "right" designates that which is morally suitable to the situation in which an agent finds himself.1 
But, as Ross notes, more needs to be said since an agent's situation contains two elements. The objective 
element consists of facts about the persons and things involved in the situation. That act which in fact is morally 
suitable to the situation as it actually is represents the objective element and is said by Ross to be objectively 
right. The subjective element consists of the agent's thoughts about the situation. That act which the agent, in 
view of his beliefs about the situation, thinks is morally suitable is called by Ross subjectively right (FE, p. 
146). 
 
Having identified these two elements, Ross asks "which of the characteristics—objective or subjective 
rightness—is ethically the more important, which of the two acts is that which we ought to do?" (FE, p. 147). In 
RG Ross was committed to the objective view on this issue. His purpose in Chapter VII of FE is to repudiate the 
objective view and to argue for the superiority of the subjective position. Ross attributes his conversion to H. A. 
Prichard's well-known lecture on this issue,2 but Ross himself advances additional arguments. The purpose of 
this paper is to explain the philosophical motivation for Ross's about-face on the issue of duty and ignorance 
and to assess the adequacy of the arguments put forward to support such a change. Before turning to these tasks, 
however, some preliminary work must be done. 
 
Part I 
In order to enhance our understanding of the topic under discussion, two clarifications must be made. One 
concerns the nature of the issue itself; the other deals with the alternative positions that can be taken. 
 
The dispute between advocates of the objective and subjective views is a normative one; in certain situations, 
these views disagree about what an agent ought to do. But this normative disagreement is at a higher level of 
generality than those we normally encounter. It is not the argument among egoists, utilitarians, Kantians, and 
others about what characteristics make an act right. Indeed, within each of these theories advocates of the 
subjective and objective views will emerge.3 Thus, for example, some utilitarians defend actual consequence 
utilitarianism; others, foreseeable consequence utilitarianism.4 That the issue arises within any theory of 
rightness, however, should not lead us to think that it is metaethical. The dispute is about how to assess an 
agent's conduct in particular circumstances; it is not about the meanings of moral terms, their logic, or more 
generally about what is going on when people engage in moral discourse.5 
 
It is also misleading to describe this as a dispute between only two positions, the objective and subjective views, 
though that is how Ross and Prichard often depict it. According to them, the objective view holds that an agent's 
moral requirements depend on certain facts about the situation; an agent ought to do that act which is morally 
suitable to the situation as it actually is. And the subjective view maintains that what an agent is required to do 
depends on his beliefs about the situation.6 So described, these two views will yield conflicting prescriptions 
only if agents have false beliefs about situations concerning which they must make moral decisions.7 But there 
are at least two possible sources of false beliefs: (i) an agent's relevant factual beliefs (about the situation) may 
be false or (ii) an agent's general moral beliefs may be false. Because errors of two different sorts are possible, a 
finer distinction is needed; as a result, three different positions emerge. 
 
The objective view may be stated as before: an agent ought to perform that act which is morally suitable to the 
situation as it actually is. According to the objective view, what an agent ought to do is determined by what the 
correct moral theory says is right in that situation, independent of his beliefs.8 What I shall henceforth call the 
subjective view holds that what an agent ought to do is that which would be morally suitable if the situation 
were as the agent believes it to be. The subjective view holds fixed the moral principles by which an agent's 
conduct is to be assessed. What those principles are applied to is the situation as the agent believes it to be.9 The 
putative view, as I shall call it, maintains that what an agent ought to do is that which he believes is right.10 The 
putative view holds fixed neither the moral principles by which an agent's decisions are to be assessed nor the 
facts of the particular situation. If an agent's moral principles are correct and all of his relevant beliefs about the 
situation are also correct, then the objective, subjective, and putative views will all agree about what the agent 
ought to do. If an agent's moral principles are correct but his relevant factual beliefs are mistaken, then the 
subjective and putative views will prescribe the same course of action, but they will differ from what the 
objective view says that the agent ought to do. The subjective and putative views will differ only when the 
agent's moral principles are mistaken. Put simply, the objective view says that an agent ought to do that act 
which is objectively right; the subjective and putative views deny this. 
 
Suppose that Ross's deontological account of rightness is correct. Suppose further that some agent falsely 
believes that act utilitarianism is correct, that his relevant factual beliefs are correct, and that the situation is 
such that act utilitarianism and Ross's theory yield conflicting prescriptions. In this case, since the agent's 
relevant factual beliefs are correct, the objective and subjective views yield the same prescription: the agent 
ought to do what is morally suitable in that situation. The putative view, however, recommends that the agent 
do that which he believes will produce better consequences than any alternative act. 
 
The dispute among advocates of the objective, subjective, and putative views is a normative one because they 
disagree about how to assess an agent's conduct. When an agent's moral beliefs or relevant factual beliefs are 
false, these views will sometimes answer the question "Did the agent do what he ought to have done?" 
differently.11 
 
Part II 
In FE, Ross defends what I have called the putative view. This is in sharp contrast with the objective view to 
which he is committed in RG. In this section I shall suggest that the reason that Ross changes his mind on this 
issue is that he alters his position on several other questions. These questions are: (1) When an agent has a 
moral requirement, what is it that he is required to do? (2) Is a necessary condition of an action's being an 
agent's duty that the agent can do it knowing or believing that it is his duty? (3) What is the relationship 
between ought judgments and agent evaluations? 
 
Regarding question (1), Ross first held that when an agent has a moral requirement, what he is required to do is 
perform a certain act. Ross characterizes an act as a production of a change in the state of affairs, or in some 
cases the maintenance of an existing state of affairs (RG, p. 42). If, for example, one has promised to return a 
book to a friend, what one is required to do is not merely to aim at returning the book nor to do what is likely to 
produce that result; rather, one is required to produce that result (RG, pp. 42-43). In spite of a great effort and 
painstaking care, one may fail to return the book; and, in spite of being careless, one may succeed in doing so. 
But only in the latter case has one done one's duty. Ross realized that, on this view, there is luck involved in 
doing what one ought to do. As he puts it, "There is therefore much truth in the description of the right act as a 
fortunate act" (RG, p. 31). Nevertheless, only the results can tell us whether one has done a duty. "The 
attainment of the result proves the sufficiency of the means." "Success and failure are the only test, and a 
sufficient test, of the performance of duty" (RG, p. 45).12 
Nine years later, however, Ross answers question (1) differently. He argues that when one has a moral 
requirement, one is required to aim atat producing a certain state of affairs, or, as he sometimes says, to set 
oneself to perform a certain act. Ross claims that to say that one is required to do some action implies that there 
is a particular kind of activity whose nature it is to be the bringing about of something. 
 
But there is no type of mental activity of which the general nature is to be the producing of a change in 
some physical object such as the moving of a hand or a foot. On the contrary, if we ask how we move a 
hand or a foot, the natural answer is that we do so by setting ourselves to do so. There is a type of mental 
activity of which the generic nature is to be the setting oneself to effect a change in a physical object, 
and of which setting oneself to move a hand or a foot is an instance. The change in the physical object, 
when it follows, is merely the result—the intended result, of course—of the mental activity. (FE, p. 
153.) 
 
One cannot be required to perform an act, then; the only thing to which one can be morally obliged is "self-
exertion, a setting oneself to effect this or that change or set of changes" (FE, p. 160). 
 
Turning to question (2), in RG Ross claims that we know the general principles of duty, the rules by which we 
must guide our lives. Knowing what is required in particular situations, however, is another matter. 
 
Our judgements about our actual duty in concrete situations have none of the certainty that attaches to 
our recognition of the general principles of duty. (RG, p. 30.) 
 
The source of our uncertainty, Ross maintains, is that any act has many characteristics, in virtue of some of 
which it may be prima facie right and in virtue of some of which it may be prima facie wrong. As Ross puts it, 
 
And though we do not always recognize that a possible act has two such characteristics, and though 
there may be cases in which it has not, we are never certain that any particular possible act has not, and 
therefore never certain that it is right, nor certain that it is wrong. (RG, p. 31.) 
 
So, because knowledge of what one ought to do in a particular situation depends on both general principles and 
the facts of the situation including the future consequences of one's acts, one can never be sure what one ought 
to do. In concrete situations, we have at best "probable opinions." 
 
In FE, Ross reverses himself on question (2). He claims that "anything that we ought to do must be something 
that we not only can do, but can do with the knowledge or at least the opinion that it is our duty" (FE, p. 163). 
Ross here seems to appeal to a version of the principle that "ought" implies "can."13 Suppose that an agent ought 
to perform an act but does not know that he ought to do so. Even if the agent can do this act in that it is within 
his power and even if he can do the act intentionally in that it is an option that he knows (or believes) is 
available to him, this is not enough to satisfy Ross. Ross, in FE, says that if an agent is required to perform an 
act, then he must know (or believe) that he ought to do that act. And though Ross does not always distinguish 
explicitly between the subjective and putative views, this demand commits him to the putative position. This is 
so because the subjective view cannot satisfy the posited requirement in those cases where an agent's moral 
beliefs are false. Ross himself understands this, as he indicates when he says that his answer to the question 
"What is my duty?" possesses a "double dose of subjectivity"; the answer depends "on my opinion as to what is 
morally suitable to what is in my opinion the state of the facts" (FE, p. 164). And, of course, either opinion can 
be false. 
 
It is worth noting that Ross's later answer to question (1) is also influenced by his understanding (and 
acceptance) of the principle that "ought" implies "can." This is because the later Ross thinks that performing an 
act is not within one's power in the appropriate sense. The term "act," according to Ross, designates causing a 
certain change by setting oneself to cause it. What is not within one's power in the appropriate sense is causing 
the change. But self-exertion or setting oneself to do something is within one's power. To convince readers of 
this, Ross argues, 
 
[I]f a man had, without knowing it, become paralysed since the last time he had tried to effect the given 
type of change, his self-exertion, though it would not produce the effect, would obviously be of exactly 
the same character as it would have been if he had remained unanalyzed and it had therefore produced 
the effect. The exertion is all that is his and therefore all that he can be morally obliged to; whether the 
result follows is due to certain causal laws which he can perhaps know but certainly cannot control . . . 
(FE, p. 160.) 
 
This passage suggests that Ross no longer allowed what he did allow earlier: that luck can play a significant role 
in whether one performs one's duty. It should be stressed, though, that in RG Ross did not deny that "ought" 
implies "can;" he simply construed that principle differently. 
 
Let us turn now to question (3). Here we are asking whether there is a necessary connection between ought-
judgments and agent evaluations. If an agent can do what he ought to do but he blameworthy for his behavior, 
and if an agent can fail to do what he ought to do but be praiseworthy (or at least not blameworthy) for his 
behavior, then we shall say that there is no necessary connection between ought judgments and agent 
evaluations. But if an agent's doing what he ought to do entails that he is praiseworthy (or at least not 
blameworthy) for his behavior, or if an agent's failing to do what he ought to do entails that he is blameworthy 
for the behavior, then we shall say that there is a necessary connection between ought judgments and agent 
evaluations.14 In both RG and FE, Ross denies that there is a necessary connection between ought judgments 
and agent evaluations. But some of the cases that he can allow to demonstrate this claim in the former work 
cannot be allowed in the latter book. 
 
In RG, Ross distinguishes sharply between ought judgments and agent evaluations. What one ought to do 
depends on the actual circumstances. My duty is "that which if I were omniscient I should see to be my duty" 
(RG, p.32). But agent evaluations—judgments of moral goodness or badness—depend on other factors. If a 
person performs an act that it is reasonable for him to think is his duty and if he does it for an appropriate reason 
(e.g., because he thinks it is his duty), then the agent is to be assessed positively even if the act turns out not to 
coincide with duty (RG, p. 32). Thus, the most obvious case of the divergence of ought-judgments and agent 
evaluations (i.e., where one is negative and the other is positive) is the case where an agent fails to do his duty 
because of nonculpable ignorance. This, of course, is not the only case where ought-judgments and agent 
evaluations can diverge. If a person sets out to do something contrary to duty or is acting carelessly, he may 
nevertheless, due to good fortune, do what he ought to do; but he will be assessed negatively. To illustrate this, 
Ross discusses the case of a man who is required to return a book to its owner. Though the man is quite careless 
in packing and dispatching the book, it is returned. The agent has done his duty, though as an agent he is to be 
assessed negatively (RG, p. 45). 
 
Clearly, a defender of the putative view cannot allow ought judgments and agent evaluations to diverge in the 
two types of cases just discussed. And, indeed, in FE, Ross indicates some skepticism about his previous views 
on this issue. He says in several places that his reliance on the distinction between rightness and moral goodness 
to resolve certain paradoxes is no longer adequate (see, for example, FE, pp. 64 and 147). And he even comes 
close to endorsing the view that there is a necessary connection between ought judgments and agent evaluations 
when he says, "The notion of obligation carries with it very strongly the notion that the non-discharge of an 
obligation is blameworthy" (FE, p. 163). Nevertheless Ross continues to maintain that there is no necessary 
connection between ought judgments and agent evaluations. To do this, he points to two types of cases where 
the putative view can allow ought-judgments and agent evaluations to diverge (FE, p. 167). In one case the 
agent does what he thinks is his duty, but not because he thinks it is his duty. Perhaps he is motivated by the 
desire to be praised by others. In the other case a person may fail to do what he thinks is his duty, but be moved 
by some other good motive, such as kindness. For example, a parent may think that her child ought to be 
punished, but fail to do so because of kindness. This is a case of moral weakness, but Ross thinks that the 
motive of the act indicates that the agent is morally good. 
 
An even more basic change is at the heart of Ross's shift from the objective to the putative view. In RG Ross 
held that two types of moral judgments are fundamental: The assessment of acts (as objectively right or wrong) 
and the assessment of agents and their motives (as, for example, praiseworthy or blameworthy). In this work 
what an agent ought to do is that act which is objectively right. In FE, however, Ross suggests that ought-to-do 
judgments are more complex; they are closely linked to, but not identical with, agent evaluations. Thus in this 
later work Ross thinks that there is a need for a third moral category, ought-to-do judgments, a category not 
parasitic on either of the other two. Moreover, Ross suggests that ought-to-do judgments are ethically more 
important than judgments of objective rightness (FE, p. 147). And while in both RG and FE Ross holds that 
objective rightness can be determined independent of the agent's beliefs, it is only in the former that he 
maintains that what an agent ought to do can be established independent of that agent's beliefs. It is not that 
Ross's account of objective rightness changes; rather, his view about what an agent ought to do is altered. 
 
Part III 
Ross's defense of the putative view is complex. He advances criticisms of the objective view, he considers and 
attempts to answer objections against the putative position, and he tries to sketch positive arguments in favor of 
that view. Here, due to considerations of length, I shall restrict my discussion to an explanation of two of Ross's 
positive arguments for the putative position. Let us remind ourselves of the question to which the objective, 
subjective, and putative views offer competing answers: What in a particular situation ought an agent to do? 
 
Ross's first argument sets out as its critical premiss a condition which (Ross holds) any adequate account of 
what a person ought to do must fulfill: "that the act which a man in any situation ought to do is that which it 
would be reasonable for him to do if he wanted to do his duty in that situation" (FE, p. 156). Ross does not 
argue for this premiss; he simply takes it as a given. Ross's next step is to convince the reader that the objective 
view cannot satisfy this condition. There may be some change that an agent can in fact produce which will be 
objectively right. But suppose that no human being can foresee how this change can be brought about. Ross 
offers an example (FE, pp. 156-57). Imagine that one has promised to return a borrowed item to a friend. As it 
turns out, if the item is dispatched in one way, a method thought to be careless, it will reach its destination; but 
if it is dispatched in another way, by a method thought to be careful, it will not reach its destination. If no 
human foresight can ascertain these facts, then no reasonable person who wants to do his duty will dispose of 
the item via the careless method. Therefore, the objective view is inadequate; it sometimes requires agents to do 
what no person who wanted to do his duty would have reason to do. But the putative view does satisfy the 
postulated condition. 
 
Two comments on Ross's first argument are in order. First, even if one endorses the argument wholeheartedly, it 
does not establish the putative view. It only refutes the objective position; it leaves the subjective view 
unscathed. And second, even if we accept the major premiss of Ross's argument, there is an ambiguity which 
must be discussed. There are different senses in which a person might have a reason to do something. In one 
sense, what one might call the subjective sense, in order for one to have a reason to do something one must be 
aware of it. In another sense, what one might call the objective sense, one can have a reason for doing 
something even though one is unaware of it. It seems clear that in the major premiss of Ross's argument he is 
using the term "reasonable" in the subjective sense. It is hardly surprising, then, that the objective view 
regarding what a person ought to do conflicts with Ross's condition of adequacy. It is not implausible to suggest 
that utilizing this premiss to argue against the objective position is question-begging. An advocate of the 
objective view would, no doubt, defend a different account of what it is reasonable for an agent to do. 
 
Let us turn now to the second argument. Ross states it briefly, but his intent is clear enough. He advances as a 
condition of adequacy on any account of what agents ought to do the following: "that anything that we ought to 
do must be something that we not only can do, but can do with the knowledge or at least the opinion that it is 
our duty" (FE, p. 163). It is clear, as discussed earlier, that the objective view does sometimes require agents to 
perform acts that they do not know or believe it is their duty to perform; this occurs whenever they are ignorant 
of moral or factual truths relevant to their situation. But the subjective view also fails to satisfy this condition 
posited by Ross. If an agent is ignorant of a moral principle or its relative weight as it applies to his situation, he 
cannot do what is required with the knowledge or even the belief that that is what he ought to do. By contrast, 
the putative view does satisfy this principle; it never requires one to do something unless one knows or believes 
that one is required to do so. 
 
The inference from the major premiss of Ross's second argument to the conclusion that the putative view is 
correct is so direct that one must be suspicious. Arguments that are this easy are usually guilty of question-
begging; and, indeed, there is some reason to believe that this argument is guilty of just that. Ross's premiss 
states, in effect, that if an agent ought to do something then it at least must be the case that he believes he ought 
to do it. By denying that either factual or moral ignorance can prevent one from knowing what one ought to do, 
Ross is ruling out the objective and subjective positions by fiat. In the absence of other arguments, Ross has not 
given us strong positive reasons for adopting the putative view. 
 
Part IV 
Let us turn now to some of the difficulties that plague the putative view. The first problem is one that all three 
views face, that of endorsing counterintuitive judgments. Ross, in fact, makes just this point against the 
objective position. He argues that according to the objective view an agent may deliberately embark on a course 
of action that he believes (correctly) is morally wrong, yet, due to an accident, succeed in doing his duty (FE, p. 
150). Thus, due to good fortune, the objective view must assess positively the conduct of an agent motivated by 
malice.15 But the putative view is open to a similar objection; in some situations it implies that an agent ought to 
do that act which in fact has the worst possible consequences. This will be the case when an agent's false moral 
or factual beliefs lead him to hold that he ought to do a certain act, and in fact that act has worse consequences 
than any alternative. Ross is correct to point out that it sounds odd to say, as in extreme situations defenders of 
the objective view must, that an agent ought to do that which he (falsely) believes is the worst alternative open 
to him. But it sounds at least as odd to say, as advocates of the putative view sometimes must, that an agent 
ought to do that which in fact is the worst alternative available. 
 
Second, it seems that on Ross's version of the putative view there is no such thing as trying but failing to do 
one's duty. Recall that according to Ross moral requirements do not range over actions; instead, an agent is 
required to set himself to perform certain acts. And when one combines this with the putative view, what an 
agent is required to set himself to do is that which he believes is his duty. This seems particularly odd since 
Ross is a cognitivist in ethics; that is, he believes that moral judgments express beliefs about the world which 
are true or false. Since moral judgments are not simply a matter of opinion, it would seem that even an agent 
who is sincerely trying to do his duty could fail (due to a cognitive error). But Ross's view cannot allow for this. 
It seems that the only case where Ross might be able to allow for trying but failing to do one's duty is the case 
of moral weakness. An agent may want to do his duty but also want to do something else which is incompatible 
with doing his duty. If an agent gives in to the desire that conflicts with doing his duty, then he might be 
described as trying but failing to do his duty. But there seems to be no other way that Ross's version of the 
putative view can allow for trying but failing to do one's duty. 
 
A closely related problem is that the putative view allows no room for a justified but false moral belief. The 
putative view implies that if an agent genuinely believes that he ought to set himself to perform a certain act, 
then he ought to set himself to perform that act. The putative view, as defended by Ross, seems to allow for no 
distinction between moral belief and moral knowledge.16 If Ross were a noncognitivist, this consequence would 
not be surprising; but he is a cognitivist. And other areas that admit of correct and incorrect answers have a 
place for justified but false beliefs. That on Ross's view ethics should turn out to be so different from other 
cognitive matters in this respect gives one reason to be suspicious. So unless advocates of Ross's putative view 
can show that this consequence does not follow from his position or unless they can show that ethics is 
sufficiently different from other cognitive areas to warrant this consequence, we will have reason to reject 
Ross's view. 
The fourth difficulty concerns the assessment of others' moral decisions. The objective view allows an obvious 
basis for criticizing an agent's moral decisions. If the putative view is correct, however, it seems that moral 
spectators cannot determine whether another agent has done what he ought to have done. One reason for this is 
that the putative view makes an agent's moral requirements a function of his factual and moral beliefs, and often 
we do not know what another's beliefs are. But there is a more fundamental reason why this position renders 
moral spectators unable to assess the decisions of others. According to Ross, a moral agent is required "to set 
himself" to do a certain act, say X. But since setting oneself to do X is compatible with all sorts of external 
behavior that does not involve doing X, others will be hard pressed to know whether another has done what he 
ought to do. In fact, even if others know that because of his factual and moral beliefs an agent ought to set 
himself to do X, and even if that agent does X, others still cannot know that the agent did what he ought to do. 
After all, the agent may have set himself to do something other than X. That the putative view renders an agent's 
moral decisions virtually immune from the criticism of his fellows is a defect of that position because one of the 
important functions of moral theories is to assess the conduct of others. 
 
A fifth problem for the putative view concerns the way that we regard moral decisions. Most people believe that 
they ought to be cautious before acting and, if possible, to re-assess the situation in order to be more confident 
that their moral judgments are correct. In short, most believe that their judgments about what they ought to do in 
particular situations are open for revision. But it is hard to see how the putative view can account for this. If 
what an agent really ought to do is a function of his factual and moral beliefs, nothing is gained morally if that 
agent alters some of those beliefs.17 It is also difficult to see how defenders of the putative view can make sense 
of the phenomenon of moral doubt. If an agent knows that he acted in accord with his factual and moral beliefs 
at the time, then if he accepts the putative view he knows that he did what he ought to have done. So the 
putative view seems to imply that one who experiences doubt about a past moral decision is confused.18 But 
surely moral doubt is both a common and intelligible experience. 
 
Finally, at one point, Ross does argue that an agent can have a mistaken moral conscience (FE, p. 165). As he 
puts it, "If to act in accordance with one's conviction is always, in one sense, to do one's duty, it remains true 
that one's conscience may be very much mistaken and in need of improvement." Ross's explanation of the 
notion of a mistaken conscience suggests that he holds the following: when an agent has done what is only 
putatively right, that agent has done what he really ought to have done; but it would have been better had he 
done what is objectively right. Ross thinks that the reason we must say that an agent ought to do what is 
putatively right is that it is putative rightness "to which praise is appropriate." Nevertheless, an agent who does 
only what is putatively right should not be content. 
 
He should be rather ashamed of having done an act which owes its rightness to its harmony with 
incorrect moral insight or incorrect opinion about the facts, and should realize that it would have been 
better if he could have amended his moral insight or his opinion of the circumstances, or both, so that in 
doing what was right in the third sense he would have also been doing what was right in the second or 
even in the first. (FE, p. 165.) 
 
But what does Ross mean by "better" here? He cannot mean morally better, since he says (FE, p. 165) that 
putative rightness is morally the most important sense of rightness. One is tempted to say that Ross means that 
the consequences would be better if an agent did what was objectively right rather than what was subjectively or 
putatively right (when the three conflict). But since Ross is neither a consequentialist nor is his theory of 
rightness extensionally equivalent with a consequentialist theory, there can be no guarantee that doing what is 
objectively right (according to Ross's view) will produce better consequences than doing what is subjectively or 
putatively right (again, when there is a conflict among the three). To illustrate, consider the following. Suppose, 
as Ross does, that (act) utilitarianism is not the correct theory of rightness. Suppose further, though, that P 
falsely believes that utilitarianism is the correct moral theory. And suppose that P is now facing a situation in 
which utilitarianism and the correct moral theory (as espoused by Ross) yield conflicting prescriptions. By 
hypothesis, getting P to do what is objectively right will not produce better consequences than his doing what 
he believes is right. So one must wonder why, on Ross's view, it would be better if the agent had "amended his 
moral insight."19 
 
In any case, it is difficult to understand how Ross can talk about a mistaken moral conscience at all. He does 
distinguish putative, subjective, and objective rightness. But when he declares that an agent ought to do what is 
putatively right, one must be puzzled about the attributions of moral error to an agent who has done just that. If 
an agent has done what he ought to have done, wherein lies the error? The notion of a moral mistake makes 
sense in a context in which an agent has failed to do his duty, but not when an agent has fulfilled those 
requirements. It is true, of course, that we want to say that someone who has done only what is putatively right 
has made a mistake; but his may simply lend credence to the claim that what one really ought to do is 
something else. 
 
Part V 
The difficulties just articulated for the putative view are significant. Moreover, it seems that in some obvious 
sense the putative and subjective positions presuppose the objective one.20 The putative and subjective views 
focus on an agent's beliefs, both moral and non-moral, and those beliefs are not about nothing. They are beliefs 
about what the situation is really like and what it is right for an agent to do in such a situation. These beliefs are 
without content unless the objective view is presupposed as the ideal. These beliefs are anchored by the truth of 
that at which they aim—the relevant moral and non-moral facts.21 At the very least, objective rightness serves 
as the ideal toward which agents are striving. But none of this proves that what an agent ought to do is that act 
which is objectively right. 
 
It is tempting to say, as Kurt Baier does,22 that the various questions surrounding this issue are easily answered 
if one makes the appropriate distinctions, such as between the prospective and retrospective points of view and 
between the perspective of the agent and that of the critic. But I do not think that it is entirely fair to suggest that 
Ross's view results simply from failing to make these distinctions. Ross was certainly aware that in undertaking 
to act an agent could not seriously ask himself, "Should I do what I think is right or what is really right?" Ross's 
approach was to distinguish three senses of rightness and then to ask, "What ought that agent to do?" Ross was 
not unaware of the different perspectives, but he simply thought that the answer to what an agent ought to 
do(ought to have done) does not differ depending on the perspective one takes. And the purpose of Chapter VII 
of FE is to argue that what an agent ought to do is that which is putatively right. 
 
Ross's version of the putative view assumes a strong connection between what one ought to do and when one is 
worthy of praise (FE, pp. 163-65). As evidence that one ought to do what is putatively right, Ross cites the fact 
that a person who does what he mistakenly believes is objectively right is at least less blameworthy than one 
who succeeds in doing what is objectively right not intending to do so. Acting according to one's convictions is 
in some sense better than fortuitously doing what is objectively right. And that sense is, apparently, that one 
who acted on one's convictions is at least not blameworthy, and perhaps is deserving of praise. The objectivist, 
of course, can make the same judgments about praise and blame that Ross in his putative mood makes; the 
objectivist simply denies that this tells us anything directly about what the agent ought to do. Indeed, an 
objectivist can say, as it seems natural to do, that an ancient Greek slaveholder was engaged in an impermissible 
practice even if he was not blameworthy for doing so.23 By contrast, the defender of the putative view would 
seem to have to say that he is not even violating any duty. To say the least, this seems awkward. 
 
Conspicuous by its absence in Ross's account of duty and ignorance is a discussion of culpable moral ignorance. 
But there may be a good reason for this; the putative view may not allow for culpable moral ignorance. Even if 
some of an agent's moral principles are incorrect, the putative view cannot direct him to work to correct these 
principles. We must assume that the agent does not know that his moral principles are incorrect (since sincerely 
held moral beliefs are held as true). Recall that according to Ross (FE, p. 163) if an agent cannot perform an act 
knowing (or at least believing) that he ought to perform it, then it is not the case that he ought to perform it. 
Thus if an agent holds a principle sincerely, he has no reason to question it and so cannot be blamed for failing 
to do so. It seems, then, that one can never be culpable for sincerely held moral principles.24 Of course, this 
immediately brings to mind extreme principles held sincerely, such as those defended by racists and Nazis. 
 
Ross's version of the putative view seems to commit him to the principle that people always ought to act on 
their moral convictions. In suggesting this, Ross is trying to capture something important, namely, how we 
value conscientious conduct or conduct from principle. But advancing the putative view in order to 
accommodate this important moral notion may have been a mistake. At least three difficulties come to mind. 
First, to some degree the objective view itself can account for the value we attach to conscientious conduct. 
While objectivists cannot say that an agent who acts according to his convictions has always done what he 
ought to have done, they can say that often such an agent is morally good. 
 
The second difficulty is that the putative view overestimates the value of conduct in accord with one's 
principles. Recall that in defending the putative view Ross still wants to allow that agent evaluations can 
diverge from judgments about whether a person did what he ought to have done; for example, an agent may 
have done what he ought to have done, but from a bad motive. Suppose that I falsely believe that always 
punishing students for doing acts of type X is objectively right. And suppose that one of my students, John, does 
an act of type X. I punish John, but from malice and not because I think that is what morality requires. 
According to the putative view, I may be blameworthy for my behavior, but there is still moral value in my 
conduct: I have done what I ought to have done, namely, what is putatively right. But if my belief about what is 
objectively right is mistaken (as we have supposed) and if I have acted from a bad motive, it is hard to see why 
there is any moral value in my conduct. 
 
The third difficulty is an internal one. In attempting to capture the value of action according to principle, Ross 
seems to hold that an agent ought to do X if and only if that agent sincerely believes that he ought to do X. But 
since this principle has the status of being indefeasible, it seems quite contrary to the spirit of Ross's ethical 
writings. Of course, someone might point out that Ross's position that no moral principles are indefeasible is 
limited to first-order rules—for example, the requirements to keep promises and to discharge debts of 
gratitude—and that the principle that I cite is a second-order one. This is true, but the status given to the 
principle still seems contrary to the spirit of what I call Ross's "irreducible pluralism"—the view that there is 
nothing that all and only right actions have in common except their rightness.25 In addition, it seems that this 
principle commits Ross to endorsing the genuineness of interpersonal moral conflicts. By "interpersonal moral 
conflicts," I mean a situation in which agent A ought to do X, agent B ought to do Y, but it is not possible both 
for A to do X and for B to do Y. Given what Ross says about resolving moral conflicts that a single agent faces, I 
should think that he would feel uncomfortable with this result.26 
 
While my aim in this essay has not been to say which position on the issue of duty and ignorance is the most 
plausible, I would like to close with two general comments which I think have some bearing on a satisfactory 
resolution of this issue. The first comment raises a question about the application of the three positions to a 
particular type of situation. Suppose that an agent is ignorant of the facts to which his moral principles are to 
apply, but he realizes that he is ignorant. The agent's problem is not that he has false beliefs, but rather that he 
has no beliefs at all. The agent's position is that he recognizes the complexity of the situation and acknowledges 
that he lacks relevant information. It seems that what the putative and subjective views must say about such a 
situation is that there is nothing that the agent ought to do (until he has formulated beliefs about the relevant 
factual matters). The objective view, of course, says that there is something in such situations that the agent 
ought to do, though he may not be culpable for not knowing or not doing what he ought to do. 
 
The second comment concerns the alternative positions that might be adopted on the issue of duty and 
ignorance. Following Carritt, I have distinguished three possibilities; but a fourth is available. According to the 
objective view, what an agent ought to do depends on the correct theory of rightness and the situation as it 
actually is. According to the subjective view, what an agent ought to do is determined by the correct theory of 
rightness and the agent's beliefs about his situation. But one might hold a position that falls between these two. 
One might say that what an agent ought to do depends on the correct theory of rightness and the situation as it 
probably is (that is, what the evidence suggests to a normal person).27 Whether this view will fare better than the 
others is a matter for further discussion. 
 
My aim has been to show that Ross's version of the putative view lacks credibility and coheres poorly with 
much else of what he has to say. If this is correct, then Ross's conversion from the objective view to the putative 
view is one of the stranger episodes in the history of ethics.28 
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10. The labels on which I settle—"objective," "subjective," and "putative"—are suggested by E. F. Carritt, 
Ethical and Political Thinking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1947), chapt. 2, especially pp. 14 and 
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11. Some have thought that Ross was guilty of a gross confusion, that he believed that an agent could ask 
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guilty of this confusion. A careful reading of Chapter 7 of FE reveals that Ross focuses on third-person 
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there may even be cases where they make different prospective judgments. Suppose that you sincerely 
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12. Ross, no doubt, should have been more careful here and emphasized that on some scenarios the book 
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16. There is one kind of false belief about what one ought to do for which the putative view can allow. 
Suppose that an agent believes that he ought to keep all of his genuine promises. Suppose further that he 
believes that his promise to Jones to do X is not a genuine one. If on the basis of these two beliefs alone 
the agent concludes that he ought to keep his promise to Jones to do X, then he has a false belief about 
what he ought to do even on the putative view. As Ross might put it, there is a lack of harmony between 
his moral and factual beliefs and the conclusion that he draws; the conclusion is not warranted by the 
premisses. But though the agent has a false belief about what he ought to do, he certainly does not have 
a justified false belief. 
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